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Summary. I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bar-
gaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information, strategically de-
layed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining is
over a consumption good, in equilibrium the “strong” buyer uses a restricted of-
fer if his optimal consumption path is conservative relative to the “weak” buyer.
A pure restricted offer may even be a costless, efficient signal. When the good
is durable, a pure strategic delay is involved in signaling a strong bargaining
position if the discount factor is high.
Keywords and Phrases: Bargaining, Sequential equilibrium, Delay, Restrictive
Agenda.
JEL Classification Number: C78.
1 Introduction
Signaling bargaining power is fundamental in bilateral bargaining with incom-
plete information. Schelling (1956) pioneered a literature that examines various
instruments that can be used for this purpose, ranging from the use of commit-
ment devices (adopting a restrictive agenda or delegating authority to a tough
agent) to the strategic use of delay. However, little is known about theoptimal
use of such instruments. In particular, does the nature of the object of potential
exchange, whether it is durable or a consumption good, affect the best way of
signaling bargaining power?
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A well-known signaling strategy in bargaining is what Admati and Perry
(1987) have termedstrategic delay. A strong bargainer can leave the negotiation
table for a sufficiently long period of time in order to convey a clear-cut mes-
sage about his tough bargaining position. Bargaining power can also be signaled
through restricted offers whose acceptance will still leave some matters to be
resolved later. Bac and Raff (1996) have shown that such signals do indeed exist
when two substitutable issues are to be negotiated and offers that do not propose
a settlement of both issues simultaneously are restricted to just one issue.1
It is natural to expect the best signaling mode to depend on the nature of
the object of potential exchange, more precisely, on whether the object is a
consumption good (a stock that has to be depleted in order to derive a benefit,
like an exhaustible resource or a pie) or a durable good like a piece of land,
promising a flow of services to the buyer. If the object is not divisible, restricted
offers cannot be used and the strategic delay is determined by the differential
valuations of buyer types, as shown in Admati and Perry. But when the object is
divisible and restricted offers are allowed, relative preferences for dated portions
of the object and hence the nature of the object may matter. Bac and Raff consider
restricted offers but rule out the use of delay; none of these papers distinguishes
between durable and consumption goods.
I present a model in which a buyer whose valuation, high or low, is private
knowledge negotiates with a seller by alternating offers over the price of a divisi-
ble object with a potentially infinite horizon. The bargaining outcome may involve
delayed and/or partial agreements. The solution concept is sequential equilibrium
refined through Admati and Perry’s (1987) restriction on off-the-equilibrium-path
beliefs. The analysis concentrates onfirst-round separating sequential equilibria
where the strong buyer signals his type at minimum cost: the weak buyer imme-
diately makes his complete information unrestricted offer and the seller accepts,
while the strong buyer uses a signaling instrument (delay and/or restricted offer).
The seller, convinced that she is facing a strong buyer, accepts. If the strong
buyer’s offer is restricted, the seller makes an offer in the next bargaining round,
which is accepted and so ends the game.
I show that the strong buyer’s equilibrium signaling strategy differs according
to whether the object is a consumption good or a durable good. The consumption-
smoothing motive increases the signaling value of restricted offers, and a pure
restricted offer (no delay) is used if the strong buyer’s optimal consumption path
is sufficiently more conservative than the weak buyer. When the strong buyer
uses a delay-restricted offer mixture, he distorts his optimal consumption path.
This signaling strategy does not degenerate as the time interval between two
successive rounds of bargaining goes to zero. An interesting implication of these
findings is that restricted offers are more likely to be observed in bargaining
1 Schelling’s observation that the bargaining agenda is not neutral to the outcome has been shown
formally, by Fershtman (1990) in an alternating-offers bargaining model and by Herrero (1989)
through a combination of strategic and axiomatic approaches. Kalai (1977) shows that the proportional
solution is the only agenda- invariant solution. Non-neutrality of the outcome to the agenda can be
used as a signaling device. See Busch and Horstmann (1997) for this point.
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environments where buyer types are more heterogeneous in terms of their opti-
mal consumption patterns. In the case of a durable good, a restricted offer is a
relatively costly signaling instrument. In Sect. 4, I show that when the discount
factor is almost equal to one (i.e., in frictionless bargaining) the strong buyer
will use pure strategic delay unless he is ”relatively and sufficiently” satiated,
a condition which roughly requires that the strong buyer’s marginal per-period
utility be sufficiently close to zero when he acquires the entire object. Since a
vanishing marginal valuation is not likely to obtain in most applications, offer
restrictions have less signaling value in bargaining over durable goods.
2 Bargaining over a consumption good under incomplete information
There are two players, a sellerS who owns one unit of a perfectly divisible pie,
and a buyerB. It is common knowledge that the seller’s valuation is zero, whereas
the buyer’s valuationV b is private knowledge. I assume two types of buyer, a
low-valuation (b = L) and a high-valuation (b = H ) buyer. The low- (high-
)valuation buyer is denotedBL(BH ) The seller’s prior assessmentπ−1 ∈ (0, 1)
that B = BH is common knowledge. The pie can be stored and its portions be
consumed in subsequent periods. The portionct consumed in periodt yields the
buyer of typeb the utility ub(ct ). I assume the following.
(A1) The function ub : [0, 1] → [0, b̄] where b = H , L is continuous and in-
creasing, with ub(0) = 0. Moreover, uL(c) is concave, uH (c) > uL(c) for all
c ∈ (0, 1], and u′b(c) is bounded from above.
Concavity ofuL(c) may provide a consumption-smoothing motive, hence the
total valuationV L(1) of BL may be higher thanuL(1). Nothing is assumed in
(A1) about the curvature ofuH (c) except that it be continuous, increasing and
lie aboveuL(c) for all c.
The players alternate in making offers until they reach an agreement on the
whole pie. The active player candelay his/her offer and make arestricted offer,
that is, an offer concerning only a portionX of the pie the seller retains. An
offer is thus a price-portion pair (P, X) whereP is the price proposed for the
portion 0 ≤ X ≤ 1 of the pie. The game starts at time zero where the active
player is the buyer.One round of bargainingis a triplet {Γ, (P, X), response}
whereΓ is the delay chosen by the active player. The passive player gives a
response∈ {Yes, No} to the offer (P, X). An agreementis an accepted offer, de-
noted (Pn, Xn)A and anoutcomeis a collection of dated agreements{ n, (Pn, Xn)A}
such that
∑
Xn ≤ 1. A (pure)strategy profile is denotedσ = (σS, σL, σH ).
Let δ denote the common discount factor. The seller’s payoff from the out-
come {t1, (P1, X1)A} ∧ . . . ∧ {tN , (PN , XN )A} is VS =
∑N
n=1 δ
tn Pn. The buyer’s
payoff is relatively complex to derive because he may simultaneously be en-
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gaged in two activities, consumption and bargaining.2 Let us now abstract from
the bargaining problem to derive the buyer’s valuationV b(X) of the pie of size
X ≤ 1. This is done by solving the following problem









ct = X .
Let {cb0 , cb1 , . . . , cbT} be the solution to the problem MAX, whereT is the
terminal consumption period.3 The optimal consumption path satisfies the feasi-
bility constraint andu′b(c
b




t+1) for 0 ≤ t < T, hence exhibits declining
consumption over time. A precise distinction can now be made between the two
types of the buyer:BH has a higher valuation thanBL if V H (X) > V L(X) for all
X ∈ (0, 1].
Because active players may delay their offers, bargaining rounds may be
longer than consumption periods. I will assume that consumption takes place
at the beginning of consumption periods, thus, if the buyer has a pie portion
Z at time τ and an agreement is reached at timet ∈ (τ, τ + 1] on a portion
Xn, the buyer can consume no sooner than dateτ + 1. If the buyer has no pie
stock at the beginning of the consumption period [τ, τ + 1) and an agreement
{t , (Pn, Xn)A} is reached at timet ∈ [τ, τ +1], consumption can resume at timet ,
re-synchronizing consumption and bargaining time. The buyer’s payoff from an
outcomeρ = {t1, (X1, P1)A} ∧ . . . ∧ {tN , (XN , PN )A} can be derived recursively,
as follows. Let the buyer have a pie of sizeZN at consumption periodτN , let
his consumption becbτN ≤ ZN , and suppose that the last agreement terminating
the bargaining game is reached at timetN ∈ (τN , τN+1] on XN . The buyer’s
discounted payoff at timetN is U bN = δ
τN +1−tN V b(XN +ZN −cbτN )−PN if ZN > 0,
andU bN = V
b(XN )−PN if ZN = 0. One can similarly define the buyer’s discounted
payoff at agreement datestN−1, tN−2, . . . , t1.
I introduce below a tie-breaking assumption (A2):
(A2) If the game has two equilibria that generate exactly the same payoff profile,
then the players play the equilibrium involving fewer offers.
Under complete information, the bargaining game described above generates








I will denote by Pb(X) = V b(X)/(1 + δ) the seller’s (accepted) price offer
on the portionX under complete information. The argument ofPb(X) will be
suppressed wheneverX is transparent.
2 In the present model, the buyer determines his consumption path optimally given prospective
agreements, which are in turn affected by the buyer’s consumption path and bargaining history.
The consumption decision is not explicitly treated as a strategy in the bargaining game (which would
require that the buyer’s consumption be observable to the seller) in order to keep the analysis tractable.
3 The optimal consumption path{cb0 , cb1 , . . .} obviously depends on the pie stockX of the buyer.
We choose not to represent the pie stockX as an argument ofcbt to economize on notation.
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The equilibrium concept for the incomplete information game is sequential
equilibrium (see Rubinstein (1985) for a formal definition in the alternating offers
bargaining context). The following preliminary result can be proved using the
arguments in Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2 in Grossmann and Perry (1986).
Lemma 2.1. In any sequential equilibrium, (i) B’s payoff is at leastmax{0, V b(1)
− V H (1)/(1 + δ)}, at most Vb(1) − δV L(1)/(1 + δ); (ii) S ’s payoff discounted
to the date at which she receives the first offer is at leastδV L(1)/(1 + δ); (iii)
given a pie of size X≤ 1 that S retains, S always accepts the offer(P, X) if
P ≥ δV H (X)/(1 + δ). Moreover, S never delays her offer.
I adopt the refinement on beliefs off the equilibrium path in Admati and Perry
(1987).4 A sequential equilibrium that satisfies (A2) and the restriction below is
hereafter called “equilibrium”.
Refinement (R):Fix a sequential equilibrium path and a historyhN after which
the buyer is active. Consider a “deviant” delaŷΓN+1 followed by the offer
(P̂N+1, X̂N+1). Call it a “bad” deviation for the buyer of typeb if the best con-
tinuation payoff he can so obtain (no matterS’s beliefs after this new history)
is lower than his continuation equilibrium payoff. Suppose that the deviation in
question is not “bad”for the type-b̄ buyer. Then, the seller’s belief must put zero
probability onb after the historyhN+1 = hN × {Γ̂N+1, (P̂N+1, X̂N+1)}.
I close this section with the definition of a “continuation equilibrium price
¯̄P
L
(X, ZN )” offered after a historyhN of N bargaining rounds whereπ(hN ) =
0, the buyer retains the portionZN and the seller has the portionX > 0 at
the beginning of the current consumption period datedτN 5 Suppose thatS is
the active player and lettN denote the time, withtN > τN . If ZN = 0, the
arguments in Lemma 2.2 of Admati and Perry (1987) can be applied to show
that in equilibriumS offers the priceV L(X)/(1 + δ) on X and BL accepts.6 For
ZN > 0, let {cLτN , cLτN+1, . . .} denote the optimal consumption path that solves
Problem MAX where the pie size isZN . BL will deplete his pie stockZN at
some future dateT(ZN ) if no agreement is reached between datestN andT(ZN ).
Suppose this is the case and consider the continuation game extending from
bargaining timet ∈ (T(ZN ), T(ZN ) + 1]. S retains the portionX whereasBL has
none. If BL is active, he offersP = δV L(X)/(1 + δ), if S is active, she offers
δT(ZN )+1−t V L(X)/(1 +δ). Both offers are accepted. Moving backwards in time, it
can be shown that there is a unique continuation equilibrium price thatS offers
after historyhN whereπ(hN ) = 0, which is accepted byBL. Let ¯̄P
L
(X, ZN ) denote
this price. Note that ifZN = 0, bargaining rounds and consumption periods are
4 See, e.g., Rubinstein (1985) and Kreps (1990) on such refinements.
5 The price ¯̄P
L
(X, ZN ) is not offered in a first-round separating equilibrium. It is a price offered
off this equilibrium path, when the strong buyer or the seller deviates.
6 Note that in the complete information version of this game, the continuation game just mentioned
would be a Rubinstein bargaining game with a pie of sizeX if cL0 = X, that is, if the buyer optimally
consumes the portionX immediately. In this case, an accepted offer on X ends the game whereas
rejections generate repetitions of structurally identical bargaining rounds. The priceV L(X)/(1 +δ) is













3 First-round separating equilibria: the case of a consumption good
A first-round separating equilibrium (FRSE) is an equilibrium in which the seller
updates her prior assessmentπ−1 to eitherπ0 = 1 or π0 = 0 once she receives
the first (possibly delayed and restricted) offer(P0, X). If beliefs are revised to
π0 = 0 after an offer involvingX < 1, the next roundS offers (P1, 1 − X)
without delay, whichBL accepts and the game ends.BH makes his complete
information offer on the whole pie andS accepts. I allowS to hold optimistic
beliefs. Under such beliefs, wheneverS eceives an offer thatBH can potentially
imitate instead of making his complete information offer (δPH , 1) at time zero,
S puts probability one onBH . It is easy to establish thatBH ’s first-round price
offer must be his complete-information offerδPH . The analysis focuses on the
equilibrium behavior ofS andBL. The following condition, coupled with (A1),
is necessary forBL’s efficient signaling strategy to always involve a restricted
offer.
(A3) The first-period optimal consumptions fromX = 1 satisfycH0 > c
L
0 .
Let S,L,H denote the preferences ofS, L and H over bargaining out-
comes. The strategies forming a FRSE must satisfy three conditions.
(C1) {0, (δPH , 1)A} H H {Γ, (P0, X)A} ∧ {1 + Γ, (P1, 1 − X)A} .
Condition (C1) defines, forBH , the set of restricted offers (P0, X) with delay
Γ followed one period later byS’s offer (P1, 1− X) that are at most as good as
the immediate (complete information) outcome{0, (δPH , 1)A}. Replacing “most”
by “least” andBH by BL in the above sentence yields (C2) forBL:
(C2) {0, (δPH , 1)A} ≺L {Γ, (P0, X)A} ∧ {1 + Γ, (P1, 1 − X)A} .
In a FRSES prefers accepting the restricted offer (P0, X) and offeringP1 on
1− X, to rejecting (P0, X) and making the accepted offer (PL, 1) the next round:
(C3) {0, (P0, X)A} ∧ {1, (P1, 1 − X)A} S {1, (PL, 1)A} .
BL accepts the pricePL = V L(1)/(1+δ) on the whole pie by Lemma 2.1. The
pricesP0 andP1 are related as follows. GivenBL’s first-period consumptioncL0
from X = 1, let Z = max{0, X − cL0} be the portion thatBL leaves to the next
consumption period, in anticipation of the seller’s updated beliefπ = 0 and the
agreement coming over 1− X. Then the price offered byS on the portion 1− X
is P1 = ¯̄P
L
(1− X, Z), which is decreasing inX, approaching zero asX → 1. As
X → cL0 from above,Z approaches zero, and therefore¯̄P
L
(1− X, Z) approaches
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PL(1 − X) = V L(1 − X)/(1 + δ). Along the equilibrium path,S should therefore
accept the offer (P0, X) if P0 + δ ¯̄P
L
(1− X, Z) ≥ δV L(1)/(1 +δ) ≡ δPL. Defining
the priceP̄X ≡ δ[V L(1)/(1+δ)− ¯̄P
L
(1−X, Z)] for the portionX, Condition (C3)
can be expressed asP0 ≥ P̄X . Since ¯̄P
L
(1 − X, Z) is decreasing inX, the price
P̄X defined above must be increasing inX. Now define the”“no-imitation” region
through the setNI (P0, X, Γ ) = {(P0, X, Γ ) satisfies conditions (C1), (C2) and
(C3)}. If the seller receives an offer (P0, X) after delayΓ such that (P0, X, Γ ) ∈
NI (P0, X, Γ ), Refinement R stipulates that she revise her prior assessment to
π = 0. Let NI ∗(P0, X, Γ ) denote the set of (possibly restricted) offers and delays
that maximizeBL’s payoff in the no-imitation regionNI (P0, X, Γ ).7
Lemma 3.1. For any (P∗0 , X
∗, Γ ∗) ∈ NI ∗(P0, X, Γ ), (C1) and (C3) hold with
indifference.
It will be useful to define a restricted offer̃XH , through (̄P
X̃H
, X̃H , 0) and
(P̄L, 1 − X̃H , 1) ∼H (δPH , 1, 0). At the restricted offer̃XH , BH is indifferent
between the immediate payoffV H (1)/(1 +δ) and paying the priceP0 = P̄X̃H for
X = X̃H to imitate BL. Therefore, by Lemma 3.1, it is possible to signal a low
valuation through a pure restricted offer by choosingX ≤ X̃H . The following
lemma locates̃XH .
Lemma 3.2. X̃H ∈ (0, cH0 ).
Given an offer on the portionX ∈ [X̃H , 1] and the priceP0 = P̄X , define
Γ = Γ (X) as the delay such that Condition (C1) holds with indifference. For
X < X̃H , setΓ (X) = 0.
Proposition 3.1. Under (A1), (A2) and (A3), BL’s FRSE strategy does not involve
pure delay. Furthermore, if cL0 ≤ X̃H , BL’s FRSE strategy consists of a pure
restricted offer. In this case, BL costlesslysignals his type.
Proof. Suppose thatBL’s FRSE offer (P∗0 , X
∗) involves X∗ ∈ [cH0 , 1) after de-
lay Γ (X∗). Since the consumption paths are not distorted,Γ (X∗) = Γ (1) and
BL’s payoff is δΓ (1)V L(1)/(1 + δ). Since BL would also obtain this payoff by
making his complete information offerδV L(1)/(1 +δ) after pure delayΓ (1), the
resulting bargaining outcome would be shorter, which violates (A2). Therefore
X∗ ∈ [cH0 , 1] cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
Consider the casẽXH < cL0 , and letX ∈ [cL0 , cH0 ). The bargaining outcome if
b = L is ρ = {Γ (X), (P0, X)A} ∧ {1 +Γ (X), ( ¯̄P
L
, 1− X)A} where (P0, X, Γ (X)) ∈
NI (P0, X, Γ ). By Lemma 2.1,S accepts the priceP0 = P̄X ≡ δV L(1)/(1 + δ) −
δ ¯̄P
L
and (C3) holds with indifference in accordance with Lemma 3.1. Note that
uH (X) + δV H (1 − X) < V H (1), anduH (X) + δV H (1 − X) is increasing inX
for X < cH0 . Since we are in the casẽXH < c
L
0 and X ∈ [cL0 , cH0 ) is assumed,
7 The omitted proofs can be found in the working paper, Bac (1997).
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BH must prefer the outcomeρ whereX ∈ [cL0 , cH0 ) and Γ = 0 to his complete
information outcome:
uH (X) + V







That is,Γ (X) must be strictly positive to satisfy (C1) with equality. Note that
Γ (X) is increasing (hence,U BL0 is decreasing) inX for X ∈ [cL0 , cH0 ), andΓ (cH0 ) =
Γ (1). Thus any offer restrictionX from the range [cL0 , c
H
0 ) yields BL a payoff
that exceedsδΓ (1)V L(1)/(1 + δ), and a pure delay is never used if̃XH < cL0 .
Consider now the casẽXH ≥ cL0 . Then, Γ ∗ = 0 for any (P∗0 , X∗, Γ ∗) ∈
NI ∗(P0, X, Γ ). To see this, recall that{0, (P̄X̃H , X̃H )A}∧ {1, ( ¯̄P
L
, 1− X̃H )A} ∼H
{0, (δPH , 1)A} by definition of X̃H , but becausẽXH ≥ cL0 is assumed, the fol-
lowing must hold:{0, (P̄
X̃H
, X̃H )A} ∧ {1, ( ¯̄PL, 1 − X̃H )A} ∼L {0, (δPL, 1)A} L




= δV L(1)/(1 + δ), hence (C1), (C2) and
(C3) are all satisfied. Clearly, any combination of restricted offer and positive
delay that satisfies these conditions would decreaseU BL0 below V
L(1)/(1 + δ).
Therefore no delay is used,Γ ∗ = 0, if X̃H ≥ cL0 . qed.
In equilibriumBL signals his bargaining power at zero cost and delay, through
a pure restricted offerX∗ ∈ [cL0 , X̃H ] if X̃H ≥ cL0 , that is, if the buyer types
are sufficiently heterogeneous so thatBL’s optimal consumption of the pie is
sufficiently more “conservative” thanBH ’s. The conditioncL0 < c
H
0 stated in
(A3) is not enough for costless signaling;cL0 must be sufficiently lower than
cH0 , at most equal tõXH . This requires thatuL(.) be sufficiently more concave
thanuH (.). I focus below on the casẽXH < cL0 to characterizeBL’s equilibrium
restricted offerX∗ and discuss the role of assumption (A3) (which implies, but
is not implied by, strict concavity ofuL(.)). Dropping (A3) means allowing for
cL0 ≥ cH0 . It is possible to find preference structures for buyer types that satisfy
(A1) but fail (A3), such that a pure delayΓ (1) is the best signaling strategy of
BL. The following proposition provides a condition in terms of per-period utilities
of buyer types; no reference is made to relative consumption paths.
Proposition 3.2. A pure delayΓ (1) followed by a comprehensive offer is BL’s
FRSE strategy if and only if, for all X in(0, 1),
V L(1)/(1 + δ)
V H (1) − δV L(1)/(1 + δ) ≥
uL(X) + δV L(1 − X) − δV L(1)/(1 + δ)
uH (X) + δV H (1 − X) − δV L(1)/(1 + δ) . (2)
The left-hand side of (2) is the ratio of the two buyer types’ payoffs viewed
from time Γ (1), while the right-hand side is the same payoff ratio viewed from
time Γ (X). The optimal signaling mode is therefore determined by a relative
evaluation of payoffs: pure delay will be used if and only ifBL cannot find an offer
restrictionX < 1 such that his payoff viewed from dateΓ (X) decreases relatively
less thanBH ’s payoff, with respect to the payoffs viewed from timeΓ (1) after
pure delay. Condition (2) fails automatically ifBL’s optimal consumption path
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is more conservative thanBH ’s, i.e., if cH0 > c
L
0 , as assumed in (A3). This is
so because for anyX ∈ [cL0 , cH0 ) BL’s consumption is not distorted (uL(X) +
δV L(1 − X) = V L(1)) while BH ’s is distorted (uH (X) + δV H (1 − X) < V H (1)).
Condition (2) may hold ifcL0 ≥ cH0 . Therefore, if (A1) holds, so must (A3) for
BL’s signaling strategy to involve an offer restriction with probability one.8
4 Effective signaling in bargaining over durable goods
Consider now a durable good that promises a constant stream of benefits to the
buyer, denotedub(X) per period. I assume thatub(X) is a strictly increasing in
X, uH (X) > uL(X) for all X ∈ (0, 1], and that the good does not depreciate. The
buyer’s payoff from the first agreement (P, X)A reached at timet is δt [Wb(X) −
P], whereWb(X) = ub(X)/(1−δ) is his total discounted utility from, or valuation
of, the portionX. Note thatuH (X) > uL(X) implies WH (X) > WL(X), which
means thatBH has a higher valuation thanBL. The buyer’s payoff can be defined
by appropriately discounting the payoffs associated with each agreement. The
seller’s payoff is simply the discounted value of payments.
Under complete information, in the SPE of this bargaining game whereS
retains the portion 1−X, S offers the price¯̄Pb(X) ≡ [Wb(1)−Wb(X)]/(1+δ) and
B offers the priceδ ¯̄P
b
(X). Both offers are made without delay and are accepted.
The SPE payoffs of this game are as given by (1), whereWb(1) replacesV b(1).
The analysis of FRSE proceeds as in Sect. 3; the details are omitted.BH
makes his complete information offerδPH = δWH (1)/(1 +δ) andS accepts,BL
delays his offer forΓ units of time and offersP0 on the portionX. S accepts
and offersP1 at timeΓ + 1 on 1− X, which is accepted byBL. The conditions
(C4), (C5) and (C6), expressed below in terms of discounted payoffs, are the




≥ δΓ [uH (X) + δWH (1) − P0 − δP1] ,











(C6) P0 + δP1 ≥ δWL(1)/(1 + δ) .
With minor modifications, the results in Lemmata 2.1 and 3.1 apply to the case
of a durable good. Define the priceP̄X = δWL(X)/(1+δ). Note thatP̄X +δ ¯̄P
L
(X) =
8 A simple observation that follows from Proposition 3.2 is that the standard case of linear prefer-
encesub = bX whereb = L, H andL < H satisfy (2). Thus, pure delay is the dominating signaling
mode ofBL in the case of linear preferences. There is no signaling motivation for restricted offers if
strategic delay is available and preferences over portions of the pie are linear. Note that such pref-
erences generate no motive for consumption smoothing given the entire pie; indeed,cL0 = c
H
0 = 1.
In this case we obtain the result presented in Bac (1999), where the buyer is assumed to “consume”
his purchases immediately.
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δWL(1)/(1 + δ). By Lemma 3.1, in a FRSE (C6) must hold with equality, thus
P0 = P̄X and P1 = ¯̄P
L
(X). If B = BL, the first agreement (P̄X , X)A is reached at
time Γ , and the second, (¯̄P
L
(X), 1−X)A, at time 1+Γ . In a FRSE,BL’s restricted
offer on X with a corresponding delayΓ (X) and priceP̄X maximizes his payoff
given at the right hand side of (C5), while holding (C4) and (C6) with equality.
Below I present a condition depending on the discount factor and the shapes of
uL(.) anduH (.) under whichBL uses pure delay.
Proposition 4.1. BL’s FRSE strategy involves pure delay if and only if, for all















The proof follows using (C4) and (C6) to solve forδΓ (X) and evaluatingBL’s





for all X ∈ (0, 1] , (4)
then BL should signal his type through pure delay. This would be the case if,
for instance, the utility ratiouH (X)/uL(X) is decreasing inX. Condition (4)
holds whenuH is a continuous, strictly concave transformationf : R → R
of uL such thatuH = f (uL) = A[uL]z where z < 1 and A is sufficiently large
to guaranteeuH (X) > uL(X) for all X. In this case (4) becomes [uL(1)]z−1 ≤
[uL(X)]z−1, which holds becausez < 1. Condition (4) also holds ifuH is a linear
transformation ofuL of the form uH = auL with a > 1. Thus,for a large class
of (concave- or linear-) affiliated buyer types, efficient signaling of bargaining
power takes the form of pure delay. On the other hand, ifuH is a strictly convex
transform ofuL in the formuH = [uL]z with z > 1, (4) will fail but (3) may still
hold.
Proposition 4.2 provides two conditions under which a restricted offer is used.
For a portionX in the left neighborhood of one, defineεL(X) = uL(1) − uL(X)
and εH (X) = uH (1) − uH (X). BL is said to berelatively satiatedif εL(X) <
εH (X)uL(1)/uH (1). BL is said to berelatively and sufficiently satiatedat largeX
if, in addition, εL(X) is sufficiently close to zero (so that the inequality in (3) is
reversed).
Proposition 4.2. If (i) BL is relatively and sufficiently satiated at X= 1, or (ii)
BL is relatively satiated at X= 1 and δ < δC (εL) whereδC (εL) is a critical level
of the discount factor, then BL’s FRSE strategy involves a restricted offer.
The conditionεL(X) < εH (X)uL(1)/uH (1) guarantees that the right hand side
of (3) is positive, andεL(X) sufficiently close to zero implies that the left hand
side of (3) is almost zero. Basically, ifBL is relatively and sufficiently satiated,
his marginal discounted utility of the durable good vanishes asX → 1. This is
sufficient but not necessary forBL’s best signaling strategy to involve a restricted
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offer. If BL is only relatively satiated atX = 1 so thatεL(X) < εH (X)uL(1)/uH (1)
and εL(X) is bounded away from zero asX → 1, then the left hand side of (3)
will exceed the right hand side forδ sufficiently close to one. There exists a
critical level of the discount factorδC (εL) such that (3) becomes an equality, and
the inequality in (3) is reversed ifδ < δC (εL). For such low discount factors,
BL’s first-round separating equilibrium strategy will involve some restricted offer
even though his marginal discounted utility atX = 1 is bounded away from zero,
provided that he is onlyrelatively satiated atX = 1.
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